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Delaware has long dominated the market for incorporations by publicly 
traded firms.  It has been able to maintain its dominant position for two 
reasons.  First, other states lack significant incentives, and have failed to 
make significant efforts, to compete with Delaware.  Second, the main 
constituents for corporate law rules—shareholders and managers—have 
been largely satisfied with being regulated by Delaware and have not pushed 
for federal legislation to preempt state corporate law.  However, in the recent 
presidential election cycle, we saw the possible beginning of an erosion of 
the consensus that a company’s internal affairs should be governed by state 
law.  The political platforms of Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth 
Warren contained proposals that would undermine Delaware’s dominant 
position—including requirements that public companies be federally 
chartered and that employees (to whom directors would owe fiduciary duties) 
elect close to half of  company’s board members.  Whatever the specific fate 
of these proposals, the mere fact that they were made by two leading 
candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination presents the most 
significant threat to Delaware over the last fifty years. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Delaware has long fascinated students of corporate law in America.  
Why should one of the smallest states in the United States determine the 
corporate law that governs most of our publicly traded corporations?  Is it 
legitimate that Delaware’s elected officials and ten—now twelve—members 
of its judiciary have so much influence over laws that affect a large segment 
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of our national economic activity?  Is there a problem that needs to be 
addressed?  And is this situation stable?1 
The lore among corporate law scholars is that Delaware’s prominence 
is due to Woodrow Wilson’s national political ambitions.2  Until 1913, New 
Jersey had been the domicile of choice for large entities, with New Jersey 
having a market share as large as the one that Delaware has today.  In his 
1912 presidential election campaign, Wilson—then the governor of New 
Jersey—made the destruction of business monopolies a keystone of his 
platform.  But Theodore Roosevelt, running against Wilson, pointed out that 
Wilson had done nothing to reform New Jersey’s own laws.  Wilson reacted 
by drafting antitrust legislation and personally pushing it through the New 
Jersey legislature.  The Seven Sisters, as the series of acts was dubbed, 
effectively outlawed trusts and holding companies.  Unsurprisingly, business 
entities moved out of New Jersey and, according to conventional wisdom, 
settled next door, in Delaware.3   
Some more recent scholarship casts doubt on this simple story,4 and the 
exact historic reasons why Delaware became the state of choice for public 
corporations are probably not all that important in any case.  So let us turn to 
the more modern period.  There are two data points that have grabbed the 
attention of commentators.  First, Delaware is the state of incorporation of 
roughly half of the publicly traded corporations in the United States.5  
Second, Delaware earns a large amount of money from incorporations.  For 
example, in fiscal year 2019, Delaware was forecasted to earn over $800 
million in corporate franchise taxes.6  The publicly traded companies 
 
 1. See generally Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for Incorporations, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg 
Ringe eds., 2015). 
 2. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 679, 731 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Myth]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Sarath Sanga, On the Origins of the Market for Corporate Law 3 (July 1, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503628 (disputing that Delaware became the leader in the market for 
incorporations only because New Jersey repealed its liberal corporate laws in 1913). 
 5. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1227 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination].  
Delaware’s share of the much larger number of closely-held corporations is substantially lower.  See 
Jens C. Dammann & Mattias Schündeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held 
Corporations, 27 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 84 tbl.1 (2011) (reporting that companies with less than 
one thousand employees are predominantly incorporated in the state of their principal place of 
business). 
 6. DEL. OFF. OF BUDGET & MGMT., FINANCIAL SUMMARY: BUDGET DOLLAR GOVERNOR’S 
RECOMMENDED BUDGET (2019), https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2019/documents/
operating/ f inancial-summary.pdf.  In addition, the budget included $500 million in revenue from 
abandoned property.  Id.  Much of this revenue is derived from uncahsed checks and thus tied to 
Delaware’s status as domicile for many corporations.  Janet Nguyen, Here’s what happens to your 
unclaimed money—and how you can get it back, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 15, 2019), 
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incorporated in Delaware, approximately 2% of all Delaware corporations, 
account for 80% to 90% of these revenue.7  The costs to Delaware of 
providing administrative services by the Division of Corporations and 
judicial services by the chancery court are less than 3% of its franchise tax 
revenues.8  Looked at as a business—and I will comment later on whether 
this is the correct perspective—Delaware earns profit margins of several 
thousand percent on its incorporation venture.  This looks like a great line of 
business to get into. 
These two facts—that Delaware accounts for the bulk of incorporations 
by publicly traded firms and that Delaware makes a lot of money from these 
incorporations—provide the foundation for the state competition debate.  The 
opening shot in this debate was fired by William Cary, a former 
commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission and then a 
professor at Columbia Law School.9  Cary argued that Delaware is engaged, 
in fact that it is the leader, in a “race to the bottom,” offering corporate laws 
that do not sufficiently protect shareholders against overreaching by 
managers.  Cary therefore favored the adoption of a national corporate law 
that would end this harmful competition among states.10 
Cary’s argument touches on the three components of the state 
competition debate.  To better understand this debate, it is helpful to separate 
these components clearly.  The first component relates to whether states 
actively compete for corporations.  Specifically, do any of the forty-nine 
states other than Delaware make substantial efforts to attract public 
corporations to their shores? 
An understanding of whether, and how, states compete is crucial in 
order to examine the second component: the direction of the metaphorical 
competitive race.  What strategy does Delaware, the state that by all accounts 
is most successful in attracting corporations, follow? 
The final component of the debates relates to the desirability of federal 
intervention.  As long as the competitive race does not lead to the very 
bottom, or to the very top, would a federal corporate law—which by its nature 
will be subject to its own flaws—be better or worse than the state laws under 




 7. Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 5, at 1225. 
 8. Id. at 1211. 
 9. David Margolick, William Cary, Former S.E.C. Chairman, Dies at 72, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 
1983), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1983/02/09/219199.html?pageNumber=4
3. 
 10. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663, 701–03 (1974). 
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Cary’s article stakes out positions on all these fronts.  He argued in effect 
that multiple, albeit unspecified, states do compete; that the race leads to the 
bottom; and that federal intervention would be desirable.11 
I. DO STATES COMPETE? 
For many years, corporate law scholars have not questioned Cary’s 
premise that states compete.12  They have, however, taken a different view of 
the directional debate, with several prominent scholars arguing that the race 
leads to the top rather than to the bottom, to laws that maximize firm value, 
and that federal intervention would hence be undesirable.13 
I got interested in the state competition debate by coincidence.  I was 
working on an article with Professor Ehud Kamar that lay at the margins of 
the debate.  In researching this article, we investigated the structure of 
Delaware’s franchise tax.14  Delaware’s franchise tax ranges from $175 per 
year to $200,000 per year and is calculated according to two different 
formulas.15  To simplify, under the first formula, companies with a large 
number of shares pay a higher tax; under the second formula, companies with 
a large amount of assets pay a higher tax.  The actual tax that a company has 
to pay is the lower of these two figures.16  As a result, only companies that 
both have a large amount of assets and that also want to have, or need to 
have, a large number of shares, pay taxes in the $10,000 to $200,000 a year 
range.  And most of the companies in that category are publicly traded 
companies, which tend to be large and which need to have a large number of 
outstanding shares to facilitate the trading of their shares in public markets.17 
Our research uncovered that the structure of Delaware’s franchise tax 
was unique.  Most other states employed one of two methodologies to 
determine the amount of annual franchise taxes a corporation must pay.  First, 
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia charged domestic firms either 
no franchise tax at all or only a trivial annual fee, ranging from $4.50 to 
$150.18  Second, twenty states charged firms a tax based on the portion of 
some measure of the company’s value, such as assets or equity, that is 
 
 11. Id. at 705. 
 12. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 2, at 681. 
 13. Compare, e.g., Cary, supra note 10 (arguing that competition leads to race to the bottom) 
with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) (arguing that competition leads to race to the top). 
 14. Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 5. 
 15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503(a) (West 2020). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 5, at 1223–25 (estimating that 80% 
of New York Stock Exchange companies pay maximum franchise tax). 
 18. Id. at 1219–20, 1255 app. A. 
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attributed to business activity conducted in-state.19  But in these states, 
foreign corporations—that is corporations incorporated in a different state—
that are licensed to do business in the state were taxed equally on the in-state 
portion of their tax base.  As a result, corporations faced no additional costs 
for incorporating in one of these states—and the respective states would gain 
no additional revenue from such incorporations.  Besides Delaware, only six 
other states imposed taxes that varied by whether a corporation was 
incorporated in-state or out-of-state and that was structured to generate 
additional income.20  However, for all these six states, the amount of 
additional income if, say, one thousand public corporations moved into that 
state would have been modest.21 
This finding, on which we stumbled by coincidence, turned out to have 
significant implications for the first component of the state competition 
debate: whether states, in fact, compete.  Other than Delaware, no state would 
stand to gain meaningful revenues by increasing its market share among 
publicly traded corporations.  The primary benefit that, according to prior 
scholars, spurred states to compete was thus absent.22 
Professor Kamar and I then started to examine more closely the general 
notion that states compete for incorporations.  We asked ourselves: What 
actions would a state that wanted to succeed in that competition take, and do 
states other than Delaware take such actions?  To answer the first question, 
we looked at what made Delaware so special.  And the answer that jumped 
to mind is the Delaware Court of Chancery.23  The chancery court combines 
two key features: it has narrow jurisdiction, thus making it a de facto 
specialized corporate court; and, it hears cases without juries, thus making its 
judges, who resolve questions of law as well as questions of fact, specialists  
in resolving corporate law disputes with respect to publicly traded 
corporations.24  One would expect that other states, if they were trying to 
succeed in the incorporations “business,” would create their own version of  
a court with limited jurisdiction focused on corporate law that hears cases 
 
 19. Id. at 1219–20, 1256 app. B. 
 20. Id. at 1220. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 15–16 (1993); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition 
in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1451 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 548–49 (1990); Cary, supra 
note 10, at 664; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence 
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 650 (1999); Michael 
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 841–42 
(1995). 
 23. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 2, at 708. 
 24. Id. 
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without juries.  But no state did.25  Professor Kamar and I thus concluded that 
Delaware faces no serious competition from other states. 
Let me attach several caveats to this conclusion.  First, corporations can 
incorporate in any state of the Union, or for that matter abroad, and a sizeable 
percentage of public corporations do just that.  Moreover, every state offers 
a corporate code and many states update this code on a somewhat regular 
basis.26  That is, states make some efforts.   
But efforts to what end?  A single corporate statute governs publicly 
traded and closely held corporations.  Most closely held corporations are 
locally incorporated and Delaware’s market share of closely held 
corporations is much lower than its share of publicly traded ones.27  Having 
a corporate statute that is not antiquated serves the needs of the local 
population that is looking for the convenience of incorporating a closely held 
corporation in-state as well as the interest of the local bar that wants to 
provide legal advice to these corporations.28  The fact that a state has a 
corporate code more likely serves to enable its residents to form a locally-
chartered corporation than indicates a serious effort to compete with 
Delaware for publicly traded corporations. 
To be sure, a side effect of having such statutes is that publicly traded 
corporations are provided with a choice of where to incorporate: in Delaware, 
as about half of them do, or in their headquarter state, as most of the others 
do.29  But the mere fact that corporations—the consumer—have a realistic 
choice among domiciles does not equate with states—the supplier—
competing for corporations.  When we want to drink a glass of water, we 
have a realistic choice between buying a bottle of Poland Spring and drinking 
tap water.  But it would be misleading to say that the local public water supply 
system competes with Poland Spring and, even though its existence affects 
Poland Spring’s pricing strategy, such choice will not generate a “race” in 
any particular direction. 
Second, shortly after we published our article, and perhaps not 
coincidentally, Nevada substantially raised its franchise tax so that it now too 
 
 25. Id. at 708–15. 
 26. Id. at 701–05. 
 27. See Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 5. 
 28. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 2, at 699.  Since closely help corporations are rarely 
involved in corporate disputes, they would not benefit correspondingly from Delaware’s expert 
judiciary.  Delaware, in turn, charges most closely help corporations only a minimal franchise tax 
and derives no significant revenue from them.  See Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra 
note 5, at 1225–27 
 29. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1591–
92 (2002). 
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can benefit from attracting incorporations.30  And indeed, Nevada is the only 
state other than Delaware to attract a meaningful share of incorporations that 
do not incorporate in their home state.  Nevada, however, seems to be 
pursuing a niche strategy that focuses on small publicly traded firms that look 
for extremely lax corporate law,31 and thus poses no fundamental competitive 
threat to Delaware’s dominance. 
Some studies also cite Maryland as a state attracting a fair number of 
publicly traded companies headquartered elsewhere.32  This is technically 
correct.  But these companies are not regular corporations.  Rather, they are 
real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) and other regulated investment 
companies.33  Maryland’s attraction for investment funds is based on the fact 
that Maryland law contains a number of statutory provisions targeted at 
investment companies, such as a waiver of the requirement to hold annual 
meetings of shareholders.34   
It is not only that Maryland is not a serious competitor for incorporations 
by regular corporations.  Maryland achieved its status of leading domicile for 
REITs and investment companies by coincidence.  Mutual funds originally 
incorporated in Maryland because Maryland corporate law, unlike the 
corporate laws of other states, did not restrict the ability of corporations to 
redeem their common stock.  This was historically part of Maryland law, 
rather than an affirmative attempt by the state to attract mutual funds.35  As 
mutual funds flocked into Maryland, they became a constituency for the state 
legislature and a source of political influence—and Maryland adopted 
additional laws beneficial to investment companies.36 
The monetary benefits that Maryland and its residents derive from 
investment companies are, however, small.  Maryland derives no significant 
franchise tax revenues from such companies and Maryland lawyers derive 
only modest benefits from providing corporate advice to them.37 
 
 30. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 
98 VA. L. REV. 935, 948 (2012) (noting that Nevada increased its maximum annual tax from $85 to 
a $11,100). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. 
& ECON. 383, 395 tbl.5 (2003) (reporting that a relatively large number of publicly traded firms are 
incorporated in Maryland but headquartered elsewhere); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of 
Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover 
Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1816 (2002) (noting that Maryland controls a sizeable 
portion of the out-of-state incorporation market). 
 33. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 2, at 693 n.43. 
 34. Id. at 721. 
 35. Id. at 721 n.149. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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That no other state seriously competes with Delaware raises a further 
question: Why?  Why do Delaware’s profit margins not entice potential 
competitors?   
The answer to this question is that competition among states is 
fundamentally different from competition among firms because states are 
fundamentally different from firms.  One way in which they are different is 
obvious.  You and I, looking at Delaware’s profits, cannot just decide to go 
into that business by forming a new state.  But beyond that, states, unlike 
firms, should not be thought of as profit maximizers.  Thus, many state 
officials have no particular interest in the incorporation business and the 
profits it generates; and even in states where some political actors may be 
inclined to “compete” for incorporations, they face special political 
constraints.38   
Pennsylvania, for example, at some point seriously considered 
establishing a chancery court with appointed judges who would hear cases 
without juries in order to compete with Delaware.  But labor unions and 
public interest lawyers opposed a bill to establish such a court, fearing it 
would set a precedent for eliminating jury trials in other cases, and the bill 
failed.39  New York is one of the least attractive states to incorporate because, 
under its law, the ten largest shareholders are personally liable for wages and 
salaries payable to the company’s employees.  Repeated efforts by the local 
bar to repeal that provision failed due to opposition by organized labor.40  
Maryland, in turn, succeeded in becoming a home for REITs and investment 
companies because a small organized group in the state pushed for certain 
changes in Maryland law—and because no other organized political group 
cared about these changes and pushed back. 
II. WHERE DOES THE “RACE” LEAD? 
If no other state actively competes for incorporations, what does this 
imply for the direction of the “race”?  When I discuss this question, I will 
frequently refer to Delaware or Delaware’s strategy as if Delaware were a 
single person that deliberately devised and then executed a sort of business 
strategy.  This is obviously meant as a simplification.  I do not mean to 
suggest that anyone in Delaware, and in particular that any member of the 
Delaware judiciary, fashions Delaware law in any conscious way to serve 
Delaware’s strategic interest.  Rather, I would suggest that what comes 
natural to many members of the Delaware bar—which proposes most 
 
 38. Id. at 728–30. 
 39. Id. at 733–34. 
 40. Id. at 732–34. 
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changes to the General Corporation Law41—and of the Delaware bench also 
happens to coincide with what promotes Delaware’s strategic interests and 
therefore accounts for Delaware’s dominating position in corporate law. 
What does the fact that other states do not seriously compete with 
Delaware imply for Delaware law?  Even absent competition, Delaware 
wants companies to pay Delaware’s steep annual franchise taxes.  Delaware 
must therefore make its law appealing to those who have power over 
incorporation decisions—the shareholders and the board of directors.  
Delaware law thus strives to offer a high-quality product on all issues where 
the interests of shareholders and managers do not conflict—and lack of 
serious competition makes it easier to offer a product that is superior to those 
of other states.  Delaware, for example, updates its law regularly, often by 
including provisions that entail no significant conflicts;42 it runs a highly 
efficient Division of Corporations; and its chancery court is the most 
distinguished state trial court in the nation.43 
With respect to issues where the interests of shareholders and managers 
do conflict, the issue of interest to race-to-the-bottom scholars, lack of serious 
competition suggests that Delaware law should be designed to appeal to the 
pragmatic middle ground.  Delaware seeks a middle-of-the-road position that 
is acceptable to both groups even if it is not optimal for either one.44  This 
way, due to Delaware’s superiority on issues where the interests of 
shareholders and managers do not conflict, Delaware would remain attractive 
to both groups relative to the laws of other states.  And indeed, companies 
incorporated in Delaware face no meaningful pressure, by either shareholders 
or directors, to relocate to another state.   
III. FEDERAL THREATS TO DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE 
As long as no state suddenly starts to compete seriously with 
Delaware—and both the failure by any state to do so in the last fifty years 
and the political barriers most states would face if they tried suggest this is 
an unlikely possibility—Delaware’s position would seem to be stable.  But 
so far, we have overlooked the most significant threat to Delaware.  That 
threat is not that some other state beats Delaware in competing for 
incorporations but rather that the federal government ends state competition 
 
 41. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 898 (1990). 
 42. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1601 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism] (listing 
examples of uncontroversial statutory amendments). 
 43. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 5, Price Discrimination, at 1212–13. 
 44. Alva, supra note 41, at 114–155 (discussing the Delaware antitakeover statute). 
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in its entirety.45  Whether we are right or wrong that no state but Delaware 
seriously competes, and whether the race is to top, to the bottom, or to some 
other point, competition among states can only take place as long as Congress 
permits it. 
To replace Delaware, Congress would of course not have to offer a more 
appealing product; it would not need to establish a court like the chancery 
court; and it would not be motivated by franchise taxes.  Congress could just 
impose its corporate law rules on all corporations with sufficient business ties 
to the United States.  Indeed, this is part of the attraction for race-towards-
the-bottom scholars like William Cary or Lucian Bebchuk who have called 
for federal intervention to preempt state law on a wholesale or piecemeal 
basis.46  For those scholars, the competitive dynamics, or Delaware’s desire 
to make itself appealing, are negative because Delaware tries to appeal too 
much to managerial interests which they see as having undue influence over 
selecting the state of incorporation.  And the fact that the federal government 
would not need to appeal to managerial interests to attract incorporations is 
therefore a positive. 
However, the observation that a federal corporate law would not be 
designed to attract incorporations is just a starting point.  It does not answer 
the question what a federal law would be designed to do.   
The commentators who call for federal law assume that federal law 
would be designed to protect shareholder interests, as they define them—or, 
more fairly, they call for specific federal legal rules designed to protect these 
interests.  However, taking a step back, once the federal government gets 
more heavily involved, we do not really know what shape federal law would 
take.  Looking at the corporate law of states that do not seem to care about 
attracting incorporations—states like California and New York—gives, at 
least to me, little reason to be optimistic that these states would come up with 
a law that benefits shareholders.47  It is not clear whether federal law, which 
likewise would not be designed to attract incorporations, will be much better. 
But let’s put to the side the issue of whether federal intervention would 
be desirable from a public policy perspective.  From Delaware’s perspective, 
the possibility of federal intervention is a clear threat, and a potentially severe 
one, much more severe than the threat emanating from other states.  But, 
happily, the best way to respond to this threat is to do what Delaware would 
want to do in any case: have its law appeal to the pragmatic middle ground. 
 
 45. Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 42, at 1576. 
 46. See Cary, supra note 10; Bebchuk, supra note 22. 
 47. See, e.g., Frederick Attea, State Has Hard Time Following a Lead, 16 BUS. FIRST OF 
BUFFALO, Apr. 17, 2000, at 30 (describing New York statute making ten largest shareholders of a 
company personally liable for wages and salaries payable to the company’s employees as “the single 
most important reason why New York shareholders decide to incorporate in Delaware”). 
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The problems of a potential federal corporate law that I have raised 
before—that it would not have to offer a more appealing product than 
Delaware; that it would not to be designed to appeal to corporate constituents 
in order to generate incorporations and franchise tax revenues; and that its 
content would therefore not be predictable or, for that matter, stable—are, 
from Delaware’s perspective, advantages.  They imply that Congress has no 
strong intrinsic desire to adopt a federal corporate law for fiscal reasons and 
that any political group calling for a federal corporate law would have to be 
concerned that federal law, over the long term, will not advance its interest. 
To reduce the risk of federal intervention, Delaware thus has to make 
sure that the main constituents potentially interested in a federal corporate 
law—shareholder interests and managerial interests—are sufficiently 
satisfied with being regulated by Delaware that they do not clamor for federal 
intervention.48 
Offering a high-quality product on issues where the interests of 
shareholders and managers do not conflict and adopting a middle-of-the-road 
approach where they do largely achieves this goal.  Even if managers or 
shareholders are dissatisfied with a particular substantive rule of Delaware 
law, they may nevertheless disfavor federal intervention.  For example, they 
may believe that Delaware, in order to attract incorporations, will be more 
responsive to new developments or they may view the current state-law based 
system as less likely to generate radical legislation than a monopolist federal 
regulator. 
At least so far, Delaware’s approach has been a success.  Even when 
Congress has enacted legislation that otherwise tramples on states’ rights, it 
has taken special care not to intrude upon Delaware.  For example, the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act,49 which federalized securities 
class actions for misrepresentation and deceit, contains the so-called 
“Delaware carve-out.”50  The carve-out specifically exempts actions for 
misrepresentations based on the corporate law of a company’s state of 
incorporation.51  Similarly, the Class Action Fairness Act, which was 
designed to assure that most class actions with a national class of plaintiffs 
are adjudicated in federal court, specifically excludes corporate law class 
actions arising under the law of the company’s state of incorporation.52   
 
 48. Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 45 at 1587. 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 77p. 
 50. See, e.g., Spehar v. Fuchs, No. 02-9352CM, 2003 WL 23353308, at *9 n.4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2003) (noting that the Securities Act contains three exceptions known as the 
“Delaware carve-outs”). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1). 
 52. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2). 
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Perhaps not coincidentally, Delaware Senator Thomas Carper was one 
of eight original sponsors (and one of a handful of Democratic supporters) of 
the Senate version of the Act.53  As it seems, Delaware’s corporate law seems 
to enjoy great respect on Capitol Hill. 
Or perhaps I should say “enjoyed” rather than “enjoys.”  Our discussion 
so far, along with most of the academic literature on state competition, has 
treated corporate law as if the only groups that mattered are shareholders and 
managers.  The “race to the bottom” case, for example, amounted to an 
argument that Delaware caters to the interests of managers and that federal 
law is needed to protect shareholders.  The “race to the top” case is that 
market forces, together with shareholders’ power over incorporation 
decisions, make federal intervention unnecessary. 
But what about other groups—so-called stakeholders?  Stakeholders are 
not entirely new to the debate.  In the late 1980s, many states adopted 
constituency statutes that permitted the board to consider the interests of 
groups other than shareholders, such as employees and customers, in 
particular in deciding how to respond to a hostile takeover.54  But in my view 
these constituency statutes were not really about protecting employees or 
customers.  Rather, they were about enabling managers to obstruct a bid that 
managers opposed but shareholders favored.  The notion that constituency 
statutes would induce a board—technically elected by shareholders but in 
practice often deferential to top management—to take an action opposed by 
managers and shareholders because it benefitted other constituents, such as 
employees, or not to take an action favored by managers and shareholders 
because it would hurt employees, seems farfetched.  Constituency statutes, 
which paid lip service but ultimately conferred no real power to any other 
constituency, thus fit neatly into the shareholder-manager duality.   
But in the 2020 presidential election cycle, we saw the emergence of 
proposals by Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Elizabeth Warren that 
would confer real power on other constituents.  Under Senator Sanders’s 
proposal, employees at publicly traded companies would be entitled to elect 
45% of the board members.55  In addition, publicly traded companies would 
be required to give at least 2% of their stock to their workers each year until 
the company is at least 20% owned, on behalf of employees, by a Democratic 
Employee Ownership Fund.  All publicly traded companies would also have 
to obtain a federal charter from a newly established Bureau of Corporate 
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Governance at the Department of Commerce.  Under this new federal charter, 
the board would have to consider the interests of all of the stakeholders in a 
company—including workers, customers, shareholders, and the communities 
in which the corporation operates.  Moreover, institutional investors, such as 
Vanguard and BlackRock, would not be permitted to vote stock held by 
mutual funds they advise unless mutual fund shareholders provide specific 
voting instruction.  At least as far as employees are concerned, this 
constituency provision has teeth as employees elect 45% of the board directly 
and the Democratic Employee Ownership Fund would in most companies, 
especially given the eviscerated voting powers of institutional investors, be 
the single largest shareholder.  Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism 
Act56 would go a bit less far but would also require a federal charter for large 
public corporations, give employees the right to elect 40% of the board, and 
have a constituency provision. 
The Sanders and Warren proposals combine two elements that would 
destabilize, or perhaps revolutionize, the current political economy of 
corporate law: the notion of a federal charter and the focus on employee 
interests—via a constituency provision coupled with an allocation of board 
seats to employees.  The first, the federal charter, directly challenges 
Delaware’s dominance.  While the second, the focus on employees, could 
undermine the power of the shareholder-manager coalition that has favored 
the preservation of the status quo. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The proposals put forth by Sanders and Warren are far from being 
enacted.  The Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden, a former Senator 
from Delaware and more moderate Democrat, has not endorsed either 
proposal.  Out of loyalty to his home state or out of political conviction, he 
may not favor such a radical change.  And even if Sanders or Warren had 
won the nomination and then the presidential election, they may not have 
pushed these proposals.   
But the significance of the proposals is not that they currently stand a 
high chance to become law.  Rather, the fact that two leading candidates for 
the Democratic nomination advanced them reflects the erosion of the 
consensus that provides the foundation on which Delaware’s dominance of 
corporate law is built.  Let’s face it.  As far as corporate law is concerned, 
Delaware is the establishment.  And these days, more than for a long time, 
the establishment is under attack. 
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